Pluralismo filosofia yahoo dating

pluralismo filosofia yahoo dating

Follow thwart with a third date: if you herded a acute remote whereby she pluralismo filosofia yahoo dating · canoa aruak dating · am taking a break from. Main · Videos; Advice dating finding help love tip news dating pluralismo filosofia yahoo dating pluralismo filosofia yahoo dating are rodrigo gabriela dating. Pluralismo filosofia yahoo dating. Tweet with a location. You can add location information to your Tweets, such as your city or precise location, from the web and.

It preceded the United Nations "Declaration on Indigenous Peoples Rights", which was adopted by countries inwhile 11 countries, including Colombia, abstained and 4 countries, including the US, voted against it UNArt. These international legal instruments have been used by indigenous movements and their supporters around the world to advocate for the protection of indigenous identities and territories within nation states.

Consequently, governments have had to adapt their extractive policies through new regulations, new systems of information, new organization of the state apparatus and new financial planning. Policy changes have been particularly important in countries where strategic resources are located in indigenous territories, as in the case of oil and gas in the Amazon basin.

This justifies a special analysis of the oil and gas exporting countries among all of the countries that have adopted C The information and sources used for case selection are summarized in a rectangular data set based on a qualitative comparative analysis QCA Cf.

The demographic hypothesis states that it depends on the relative weight of indigenous peoples within national populations. The sociological hypothesis is more difficult to grasp since it requires a socio-spatial perspective to contrast the main reserves of oil and gas and the indigenous territories, which is rarely available at the national level.

The legal territories of indigenous peoples may be clearly defined, but they have different status in each country with respect to protection from the impact of extractive activities.

Furthermore, natural resource cadasters tend to overestimate the location of reserves to maximize the government preemptive rights. However, the persistence of protracted social conflicts in 6 out of 8 countries the exceptions being Mexico and Venezuela after the adoption of C indicates a strong correlation between the existence of such capacities and the need to improve accountability in relation to oil and gas policies ECLAC Such conflicts also indicate that effective accountability needs to be improved in the countries where they occur, although this does not mean that improvements are not necessary in the absence of such conflicts.

To solve this problem, we applied a smoking-gun test 10 to the case where we found the longest process since the adoption of C, namely Colombia. We replicated this test later in Ecuador. We chose to compare both causal mechanisms following a most similar system design, 11 i.

Process-Tracing We use process-tracing to analyze "evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case" Bennett and Checkel7.

A causal mechanism is a combination of entities triggered by X and engaging in activities that end up in Y, where each entity is an insufficient but necessary part of an overall mechanism Beach and Pedersen Our process is based on a congruence analysis featuring the causal relationships between the three orders of change, consistent with the path dependence theory, which states that a critical juncture is the starting point of the longstanding continuity of an institutional system, due to increasing returns and lock-in effects that make change more and more costly.

However, this analogy of three orders of change with three levels of action does not respect the idea that third-order change is a "sociological process" that is different from second- and first-order change, which involve a "learning process" Hall Such discontinuity leads to a distinction between the three orders of policy change, with the first affecting instrument settings, the second affecting policy instruments and prioritization of goals, and the third affecting settings, instruments and goal priorities simultaneously.

Drawing on this framework, we suggest that policy change can best be traced by a one-way sequence analysis leading from third to second and first orders of change, and by evaluating the consistency between policy aims and means at each level Cf.

Thus, third-order change is characterized by normative aims implying constitutional reforms after the adoption of C These objectives are defined according to the cognitive framework or the paradigm accepted by a community, through the adoption of norms and rules that act as "informal institutions" March and Olsen Second-order change is characterized by strategic aims implying policy design following constitutional reforms.

These objectives are defined according to the state's capacities and needs, through the selection of policy instruments, not only taken separately but, above all, incorporated into a policy mix Howlett First-order change is characterized by operational aims implying instrument calibration during early implementation of the policy. These objectives are defined according to short-term necessities and teleological criteria, through adjustment of the existing policy mix during its implementation.

Secondary sources were used to identify international law instruments and contextual information on indigenous rights in LAC oil-exporting countries. Previous studies on social conflicts related to oil and gas exploitation in the Amazon were used to identify key confrontational moments between social actors including indigenous organizations and environmental NGOspublic and private oil companies, and state agencies including the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government after the adoption of C Primary sources were used to identify policy design preferences and instrument calibration.

We used a simple typology of instruments based on state resources and including nodality, authority, treasury and organization Hood ; Howlett Nodality instruments refer to information resources processed and produced by government agencies; authority instruments refer to specific and general regulation of policy areas; treasury instruments refer to the economic and financial dimensions of these areas; organization instruments refer to the entities involved in the design and implementation of a policy.

These instruments are the practical elements by which state agencies translate ideas into institutions, and therefore they provide reliable empirical observable units of second and first orders of change Table 4. Data were collected from institutional sources and completed through interviews of civil servants from both countries. In Colombia, information came from Constitutional Court jurisprudence since and congressional archives.

In Ecuador, information came from the constitutional debates ofexecutive assessments of the prior consultation regarding Southern Amazon bids inand assessments of the legislative debate on the declaration of national interest in relation to blocks 31 and Third-Order Change The institutionalization of accountability to indigenous peoples in oil-exporting countries has been shaped by constitutional reforms in Brazil andColombia andVenezuelaEcuador andPeru and and Boliviaand ECLAC In all the cases selected, the political constitution recognizes the principles of pluralism and cultural diversity, although they have different ideas about the state's duty to protect indigenous rights.

In cases like Ecuador and Bolivia, the constitution refers explicitly to plurinationalism, Republic of EcuadorArt. In others, it simply refers to the protection of minorities by the state, as in the case of Colombia Republic of ColombiaArt. These countries undoubtedly underwent quite different processes. These changes came after decades of mobilizations and politicization of the indigenous peoples Laurent ; Massalwhich does not mean the latter phenomenon was responsible for the former, but rather that it took advantage of the opening of a policy window.

Bolivia would likewise wait until to reform its constitution and adapt the institutional design of the state accordingly. As for Peru, the Constitution of was adopted before ratifying ILO Convention and there was no constitutional amendment related to it afterwards. The last constitutional reform in Venezuela took place three years before that country ratified the convention. The differences among these constitutional reforms implied different degrees of policy change regarding recognition of the right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation.

The Colombian constitution institutionalizes the existence of special districts where indigenous peoples exercise their collective rights. It also explicitly states that the exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories should neither infringe nor threaten the cultural, social and economic integrity of indigenous communities Republic of ColombiaArt. In contrast, the Peruvian constitution assigns neither specific rights nor territories to indigenous peoples as such.

Between both extremes, these ideas are echoed in the constitutions of Venezuela Republic of VenezuelaArt. This third-order change has led simultaneously to the emergence of new assigned agencies and to the expansion of social accountability mechanisms at both the meso and micro levels. Among the main assigned agencies are national auditing offices, courts of auditors, district attorneys' offices, ombudsmen, national human rights commissions, etc.

The Ecuadorian Constitution of eventually improved horizontal accountability through greater control over the executive by the legislative power, particularly in restricting oil exploitation within protected areas and indigenous territories and conditioning them to a declaration of national interest by the National Assembly or by referendum Republic of EcuadorArt. Although the Constitutional Court has not yet proven to be a hardline balance agency, horizontal accountability has influenced the implementation of oil policy in indigenous territories through the National Assembly Special Commission on Biodiversity and Natural Resources Republic of Ecuador Although this commission has no coercive power over the executive, it does act as a whistleblower to foster transparency through answerability of the Secretary of Hydrocarbons and the Petroamazonas national oil company.

Thus, the avoidance of blame currently provides the main protection for indigenous rights to participate in oil policy. Second-Order Change The paradox in Colombia is the fact that, although many new rules have been adopted at the base of Constitutional Court jurisprudence, 14 there is still general discontent among indigenous organizations regarding the implementation of prior consultation Foundation of Due Process of Law The constitution establishes the right to prior consultation as part of the civil right to participate Republic of ColombiaArt.

Its contents have been developed as a consequence of the judicialization of civil participation in Colombia, within the context of violence caused by the armed conflict that has led to the militarization of indigenous territories and the forced displacement of local communities.

Other, weaker instruments were added through presidential orders in and regarding prior consultation procedures in order to cope with restrictive interpretation of the constitution by the Constitutional Court.

In Ecuador, there is also a claim for adequate means at the secondary level of regulation and effective communication channels between the state, indigenous organizations and other non-governmental organizations NGOs Burgos ; DPLF The implementation of prior consultation procedures has been more erratic there than in Colombia since the ratification of ILO Convention in Nevertheless, these initiatives were hampered by protracted conflicts over oil contamination and violation of the right to prior consultation within indigenous territories, so that no real progress has been recorded until recently.

The Constitution of assumed most of the principles of the Constitution ofwhich have since been significantly enhanced through a special chapter dedicated to the collective rights of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian peoples Republic of Ecuador, Chapter 4, Art.

In the National Assembly adopted the Organic Law on Citizen Participation, which qualifies as a superior norm in the Ecuadorian legal system. However, unlike its Colombian counterpart, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador has dismissed any interpretation of the right to prior "consultation" as a matter of prior "consent" through a ruling it handed down in regarding the scope of the Mining Law that had been adopted in Republic of Ecuador In Ecuador they depend on the Ministry of Finance, so they are traditionally highly concentrated.

The Financial Law of was intended to eliminate all mechanisms of pre-assignation through special funds to the army, Amazonian provinces, universities, etc. However, the current distribution of oil incomes actually coincides with the decentralized public administration map. The Organic Code of Territorial Organization and Decentralization adopted in formally recognized the indigenous territories as special territorial districts Republic of EcuadorArt.

Under this regulation Republic of EcuadorArt. The instruments of organization are also quite well defined in both countries. The attempt to organize a permanent roundtable for coordination between indigenous organizations and the government in Colombia failed due to lack of legitimacy and indigenous group's refusal to participate between and It was gradually replaced with thematic consulting commissions at the national and departmental levels.

Initially, the Ministry of the Interior and Justice was in charge of prior consultation procedures, but these matters are currently being handled through the Department of Indigenous Affairs, Minorities and Roms, and the National Authority for Environmental Licenses.

These agencies are accountable to legally elected indigenous authorities for activities carried out by the national oil company Ecopetrol and multinational oil companies within indigenous territories.

In Ecuador, the government tried to centralize all indigenous affairs through the Department of Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation between and The experience proved detrimental to the public interest since said department actually had no coercive power to counterbalance that of major ministries such as Energy and Mining, or Finance. The highest state agency for participation is currently the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control aka "The Fourth Power," since it is composed of members of civil societybut thus far it has had little to do with prior consultation on oil-related activities.

The state agencies in charge of such procedures are the Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources acting through the Secretary of Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of the Environment which is in charge of environmental licensing in protected areas. They are both accountable to the Coordinating Ministry of Strategic Sectors and to the National Assembly's Permanent Commission on Biodiversity and Natural Resources regarding the activities of Petroamazonas and its multinational partners.

Finally, the instruments of nodality are similar in both countries. They include social and environmental impact assessments, which have been institutionalized for the past two decades through environmental policies. In practical terms, these assessments include the right of local communities including indigenous peoples to be informed about the risks involved in oil and gas activities, to monitor the management of the environment, and to obtain reparations and indemnities for negative impacts such as contamination, violation of territorial integrity, and damages to private property.

Moreover, development planning in both countries is subject to social control by local populations. The National Council for Economic and Social Planning in Colombia and the National Secretary of Planning and Development in Ecuador elaborate multiannual policy documents within the constitutional framework of civic participation and prior consultation. Indigenous peoples in both countries are responsible for elaborating local development plans in accordance with the general national planning guidelines, to be applied to the special oil-financed public investment funds.

First-Order Change Although the process of transition from constitutional reform to policy change was more erratic in Ecuador than in Colombia, since it underwent two constitutional reforms, the government in both countries showed a preference for weak executive instruments such as executive decrees. In Colombia, the conflict which confronted the U'wa community with the Occidental Petroleum company and the Colombian state constituted the most dramatic example of a policy failure, since neither the government nor the oil company were ever able to counteract the indigenous opposition to oil activities in their territory.

Likewise, in Ecuador, the conflict between the Kichwa community of Sarayaku and the Arco and Burlington companies, and the conflict between the Shuar people of the Transkutuku area and CGC San Jorge epitomize the oil policy failures of all governments until now.

Before second-order change could improve enforcement by indigenous peoples and government answerability at an operational level, judicialization of accountability was required through Constitutional Court jurisprudence regarding the protection of indigenous rights.

As mentioned above, the Constitutional Court in Colombia has been playing a key role in the enforcement of indigenous peoples' rights sinceunlike the Ecuadorian Supreme Court. Horizontal accountability has thus conditioned legal reforms and oil policy implementation in indigenous territories in this country, thanks to a high degree of coercion for constitutional protection. In Ecuador, the Permanent Commission on Biodiversity and Natural Resources purports to act as a balancing agency, by controlling the activities of Petroamazonas through assessments every six months prepared by the Secretary of Hydrocarbons.

However, this control has only been mandatory for oil activities carried out in block 43 aka ITT oilfields, for Ishpingo-Tiputini-Tambococha since it was first established in This was done through declaration of the importance, in terms of national interest, of these reserves located within the Yasuni National Park Republic of Ecuador In fact, the commission has no real capacity to sanction infringements of environmental licenses or violation of declarations of national interest except when they affect non-contacted peoples, a situation which is constitutionally codified as a risk of genocide.

In Colombia, the permanent consultation roundtable or local and national consulting commissions have endured severe criticism from, and low participation on the part of representatives of indigenous organizations. This has improved horizontal accountability through greater judicial control over the executive and legislative branches. In the meantime, indigenous organizations and their supporters have gained international support from the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, which has reaffirmed their right to prior consultation and recommended the application of precautionary measures to protect indigenous peoples from negative impacts of oil activities.

However, in Ecuador this has also led to the criminalization of social protest and the militarization of indigenous territories, the multiplication of detention orders against indigenous and political leaders, and the persecution of environmental and human rights NGOs accused of illegal activities.

Causal Mechanism The right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation guaranteed through the adoption of C by national states is closely related to the existence of social conflicts over oil and gas extraction in indigenous territories. Once ratified by the legislative or the executive branch at the national level, it constitutes a non-electoral democratic control mechanism with little coercive power over the state, since there is no possibility of a veto or requirement of prior consent.

Nonetheless, when combined with other political accountability mechanisms, it does become a powerful constraint on policy choices for non-state actors. Constitutional reforms can complement the adoption of C by institutionalizing ideas regarding indigenous rights, but they are neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause for these rights to become effective.

In Colombia and Ecuador the constitutional reforms of andrespectively, were indeed influenced by the adoption of C, but our research has shown that policy change followed different paths.

¿Qué es el Liberalismo? - Ciencias Políticas - Educatina

While the constitutional reform in Colombia strengthened the balanced agencies that would later sustain second-order changes through policy control by the judicial branch, the reform in Ecuador was not sufficient to foster policy change in the absence of a strong and active constitutional court. Hence, a second reform was necessary in before a second-order policy change was able to institutionalize the new ideas regarding indigenous participation in determining oil policy.

When existing policy instruments institutionalize social control, prior consultation programs become an effective way to prevent or mitigate social conflicts. These first-order changes then constitute sufficient cause to improve participation through instrument calibration. In contrast, when third-order changes are not complemented by accurate policy design and institutional reforms, protracted social conflicts become more frequent.

The Constitution of assumed most of the principles of the Constitution ofwhich have since been significantly enhanced through a special chapter dedicated to the collective rights of indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian peoples Republic of Ecuador, Chapter 4, Art. In the National Assembly adopted the Organic Law on Citizen Participation, which qualifies as a superior norm in the Ecuadorian legal system. In Colombia they have been improved by the General System of Royalties -through different investment funds of the National Planning Department Republic of Colombia In Ecuador they depend on the Ministry of Finance, so they are traditionally highly concentrated.

The Financial Law of was intended to eliminate all mechanisms of pre-assignation through special funds to the army, Amazonian provinces, universities, etc.

However, the current distribution of oil incomes actually coincides with the decentralized public administration map. The Organic Code of Territorial Organization and Decentralization adopted in formally recognized the indigenous territories as special territorial districts Republic of EcuadorArt. Under this regulation Republic of EcuadorArt.

The instruments of organization are also quite well defined in both countries. It was gradually replaced with thematic consulting commissions at the national and departmental levels. Initially, the Ministry of the Interior and Justice was in charge of prior consultation procedures, but these matters are currently being handled through the Department of Indigenous Affairs, Minorities and Roms, and the National Authority for Environmental Licenses.

These agencies are accountable to legally elected indigenous authorities for activities carried out by the national oil company Ecopetrol and multinational oil companies within indigenous territories. In Ecuador, the government tried to centralize all indigenous affairs through the Department of Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation between and The experience proved detrimental to the public interest since said department actually had no coercive power to counterbalance that of major ministries such as Energy and Mining, or Finance.

The state agencies in charge of such procedures are the Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources acting through the Secretary of Hydrocarbons and the Ministry of the Environment which is in charge of environmental licensing in protected areas. Finally, the instruments of nodality are similar in both countries.

They include social and environmental impact assessments, which have been institutionalized for the past two decades through environmental policies. In practical terms, these assessments include the right of local communities including indigenous peoples to be informed about the risks involved in oil and gas activities, to monitor the management of the environment, and to obtain reparations and indemnities for negative impacts such as contamination, violation of territorial integrity, and damages to private property.

Moreover, development planning in both countries is subject to social control by local populations. The National Council for Economic and Social Planning in Colombia and the National Secretary of Planning and Development in Ecuador elaborate multiannual policy documents within the constitutional framework of civic participation and prior consultation.

Indigenous peoples in both countries are responsible for elaborating local development plans in accordance with the general national planning guidelines, to be applied to the special oil-financed public investment funds. First-Order Change Although the process of transition from constitutional reform to policy change was more erratic in Ecuador than in Colombia, since it underwent two constitutional reforms, the government in both countries showed a preference for weak executive instruments such as executive decrees.

Likewise, in Ecuador, the conflict between the Kichwa community of Sarayaku and the Arco and Burlington companies, and the conflict between the Shuar people of the Transkutuku area and CGC San Jorge epitomize the oil policy failures of all governments until now. Before second-order change could improve enforcement by indigenous peoples and government answerability at an operational level, judicialization of accountability was required through Constitutional Court jurisprudence regarding the protection of indigenous rights.

Horizontal accountability has thus conditioned legal reforms and oil policy implementation in indigenous territories in this country, thanks to a high degree of coercion for constitutional protection.

In Ecuador, the Permanent Commission on Biodiversity and Natural Resources purports to act as a balancing agency, by controlling the activities of Petroamazonas through assessments every six months prepared by the Secretary of Hydrocarbons.

However, this control has only been mandatory for oil activities carried out in block 43 aka ITT oilfields, for Ishpingo-Tiputini-Tambococha since it was first established in This was done through declaration of the importance, in terms of national interest, of these reserves located within the Yasuni National Park Republic of Ecuador In fact, the commission has no real capacity to sanction infringements of environmental licenses or violation of declarations of national interest except when they affect non-contacted peoples, a situation which is constitutionally codified as a risk of genocide.

In Colombia, the permanent consultation roundtable or local and national consulting commissions have endured severe criticism from, and low participation on the part of representatives of indigenous organizations.

This has improved horizontal accountability through greater judicial control over the executive and legislative branches. In the meantime, indigenous organizations and their supporters have gained international support from the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, which has reaffirmed their right to prior consultation and recommended the application of precautionary measures to protect indigenous peoples from negative impacts of oil activities.

However, in Ecuador this has also led to the criminalization of social protest and the militarization of indigenous territories, the multiplication of detention orders against indigenous and political leaders, and the persecution of environmental and human rights NGOs accused of illegal activities.

Causal Mechanism The right of indigenous peoples to prior consultation guaranteed through the adoption of C by national states is closely related to the existence of social conflicts over oil and gas extraction in indigenous territories. Once ratified by the legislative or the executive branch at the national level, it constitutes a non-electoral democratic control mechanism with little coercive power over the state, since there is no possibility of a veto or requirement of prior consent.

Nonetheless, when combined with other political accountability mechanisms, it does become a powerful constraint on policy choices for non-state actors. Constitutional reforms can complement the adoption of C by institutionalizing ideas regarding indigenous rights, but they are neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause for these rights to become effective.

In Colombia and Ecuador the constitutional reforms of andrespectively, were indeed influenced by the adoption of C, but our research has shown that policy change followed different paths. While the constitutional reform in Colombia strengthened the balanced agencies that would later sustain second-order changes through policy control by the judicial branch, the reform in Ecuador was not sufficient to foster policy change in the absence of a strong and active constitutional court.

Hence, a second reform was necessary in before a second-order policy change was able to institutionalize the new ideas regarding indigenous participation in determining oil policy. When existing policy instruments institutionalize social control, prior consultation programs become an effective way to prevent or mitigate social conflicts.

These first-order changes then constitute sufficient cause to improve participation through instrument calibration. In contrast, when third-order changes are not complemented by accurate policy design and institutional reforms, protracted social conflicts become more frequent.

pluralismo filosofia yahoo dating

Hence, social conflicts are a sufficient though unnecessary cause of second-order change. They can either be a cause of improvement of accountability when mediated at a political level by balanced agencies, as in Colombia, or a cause of policy failure when demands by social actors are not supported by national balanced agencies, as in the case of Ecuador. The causal mechanism linking third-order change to second- and first-order change is presented in Figure 1. The adoption of a new non-electoral democratic control mechanism, such as C, triggers the process leading to increased accountability in sectorial policy such as oil and gas policies.

Third-order change requires constitutional and institutional system reforms that constitute the first interplay between ideas and institutions. These reforms command a new policy design in different sectorial areas, through the selection of instruments that constitutes a second-order change. The nature of the policy mix determines the way social conflicts are processed, either in a negotiated way when selecting consistent instruments regarding third-order change, or in a protracted way when these instruments lack consistency.

This constitutes a second interplay between ideas and institutions, which mediates contradictory interests of social, economic and political actors. Non-state actors involved in these conflicts require the support of balanced agencies in order to counter-balance the executive power. The support of these agencies is fundamental for improving horizontal accountability and social control over the state.

Causal mechanism of the politics of accountability for C Source: Elaborated by the authors. Horizontal accountability mechanisms then provide a guide to policy instrument calibration during the early moments of policy implementation.

r botto online dating

This is a third interplay between ideas and institutions, in which ideas supported by social actors are effectively taken into account by the government to increase accountability.

Hence policy instrument calibration conditions long-term policy implementation through the stabilization of participation and social control routines. This eventually enforces political accountability in the reformed policy area, which can in turn be replicated to other areas. Accountability as a Policy Problem The policy of accountability is essentially designed for procedural purposes, inasmuch as it affects the relationships between state and society Howlett It may be participatory in itself or it may correspond to hierarchical modes of governance.

This means that instrument mix overrates state legal resources, as opposed to nodality informationtreasury, and organization. Accountability is a combination of three modalities, including vertical-electoral mechanisms, horizontal-intrastate mechanisms, and non-electoral democratic control mechanisms. The reason why governments actually bother about it is because they are obliged to do so by judicial and legislative power and by public opinion.

In a context of increasingly complex interplay among state, society and the economy, non-electoral democratic controls are not an alternative to horizontal accountability aimed at strengthening vertical-electoral mechanisms: Otherwise these mechanisms are mere formalities since they do not imply coercion. Therefore, non-electoral democratic controls ought to be secured by horizontal accountability, so that assigned agencies can exert effective influence on the policy design and implementation by the government.

Rather than substituting balance agencies, they provide a natural complement for them. However, without strong legal support, they remain subject to conjunctural variations, depending on the good will of the executive and the intensity of the social protest. In a delegative democracy, non-electoral democratic controls are not the solution: The analysis of indigenous participation in oil and gas activities shows that the consistency of the instrument mix regarding accountability may vary from one country to another, depending on the relationships among state, society and economy on the one hand, and among the balance agencies on the other.

However, a similar causal mechanism links macro level third-order to meso and micro levels second- and first- orders of the policy process, making policy change irreversible. After demonstrating that constitutional reforms are an insufficient but necessary condition for implementing third-order change regarding accountability, we have shown that they are an independent variable for second-order change, rather than the result, which confirms that third-order change consists of a discontinuity in the social learning process, rather than an accumulated effect of second-order changes.

Our research concludes that the initial ideational dimension of third-order change needs to be institutionalized through policy design improving horizontal accountability mechanisms that sustain non-electoral democratic controls. These mechanisms may later be calibrated through first-order change regarding the operationalization of accountability. This is ultimately the key to explaining the greater development of the right of indigenous peoples to consultation and participation in Colombia, in spite of the structural obstacles and the absence of any consistent instrument mix for the policy of accountability.

This is also why we can expect that further development of accountability through non-electoral democratic mechanisms will depend on the degree of autonomy and coercion of these agencies, as well as the enforcement power of non-state actors.

Non-electoral democratic controls relate to the possibility of influencing and changing public action by individual and collective actors. They still aim at correcting the deficits of vertical-electoral and horizontal accountability, which remain common in Latin America, but they adopt more sophisticated modalities than prior mechanisms of social accountability, as and when they are institutionalized.

pluralismo filosofia yahoo dating

Today, the question is not why governments should implement policies of participation and social control but how they actually do it. Progress in the Past Decade and Remaining Challenges. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra. Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos. Beach, Derek and Rasmus Brun Pedersen.

University of Michigan Press. Bennett, Andrew and Jeffrey Checkel. From philosophical roots to best practices. Goodin, Michael Moran and Martin Rein, Mexico City and Sao Paulo. Discursos, trayectorias, expectativas y limitaciones.

R101 botto online dating

Reflections on the Tools of Government after Two Decades. A multi-level nested model of policy instrument choice and policy design. Howlett, Michael and Benjamin Cashore. Understanding Policy Change as a Methodological Problem. Is it Worth the Effort?

Isunza Vera, Ernesto and Alberto Olvera, coords. Isunza Vera, Ernesto and Alberto Olvera. The New Institutionalism in Political Science. Mainwaring, Scott and Christopher Welna, eds. Democratic Accountability in Latin America. March, James and Johan Olsen. Organizational Factors in Political Life. The Self Restraining State: Ciudadanos y medios en las nuevas democracias latinoamericanas, edited by Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitz, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule.

The Johns Hopkins University Press. Peruzzotti, Enrique and Catalina Smulovitz, eds. Ciudadanos y medios en las nuevas democracias latinoamericanas. Peruzzotti, Enrique and Catalina Smulovitz. Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science.

Pierre, Jon and B. Governance, Politics and the State. Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. University of Chicago Press. Power and Accountability in New Democracies. Seawright, Jason and John Gerring.